Third Circuit, United States v. Cain: the good-faith exception, a warrant's scope and suppression of evidence from electronic devices

On November 17, 2026, a Third Circuit panel unanimously reversed a district court's suppression order, holding that officers relied in good faith on a warrant to search a defendant's electronic devices for images of two children, without deciding whether the warrant was supported by probable cause.

CourtNovember 17, 20264 min readThe Constilumen record

What happened

On November 17, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided United States v. Cain, No. 25-2721, in a precedential opinion. The panel reversed an order of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that had suppressed evidence taken from Jason Cain's electronic devices under four search warrants, and remanded for further proceedings. Cain had been indicted on seven counts of producing child sexual abuse material and two counts of possessing it. The government appealed. Judge Freeman wrote the opinion for a unanimous panel that also included Judges Phipps and Mascott. There was no separate opinion.

What the opinion says

The district court had held that the first two warrants lacked probable cause, that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply, and that the later warrants were tainted. The Third Circuit examined only the first warrant. It stated: "Even if probable cause was lacking for that warrant (a question we need not reach), the police who executed it had an objectively reasonable belief that executing the warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment."

Applying United States v. Leon (1984), the court noted that Cain did not contend anything in the warrant application was false, that a magistrate issued the warrant, and that a prosecutor approved the application first. It held the affidavit was not "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in [the] existence [of probable cause] entirely unreasonable."

The court disagreed with the district court's reading of the first warrant as a search for child pornography. "Properly construed," the opinion states, "the first warrant authorized police to search for images of Victim 1 and Victim 2, not child pornography." It reasoned that "not all images used for sexual gratification are pornographic" and that additional images could have investigatory value. The court added that its task "would have been far easier if the affidavit had expressly stated how images of Victims 1 and 2 would aid the investigation," but concluded that "there is a connection in this case."

Because the first and second warrants authorized searches of the same devices, the court held that "any possible Fourth Amendment error with regard to the second warrant was harmless," and that good-faith reliance on the first warrant extended to the third and fourth warrants. It also rejected Cain's argument that the first two warrants were unlawful general warrants, holding that they authorized searches of "a broad category of electronic devices in pursuit of images of Victim 1 and Victim 2, as related to violations of the statutes listed in the warrant," which it found consistent with the particularity requirement under circuit precedent.

The other side

The panel was unanimous. The district court's reasoning, as the opinion quotes it, was that "the affidavit clearly states that police were hoping to find images of Victims 1 and 2 kept by Defendant for sexual gratification—child pornography," that the trooper's opinion about electronic devices "is only necessary if police are searching for child pornography," and that it was "unclear what evidence—other than the pictures the Victims' mother already had on her phone—[the] Trooper . . . hoped to collect." Cain argued on appeal that the first and second warrants were general warrants. The opinion also notes that in Virgin Islands v. John (2011) and United States v. Zimmerman (2002) the Third Circuit held that certain allegations of sexual misconduct with children did not establish probable cause to search a home for child pornography, and that the good-faith exception did not apply; the panel held those cases "not relevant here, where the first warrant did not seek child pornography."

Where it sits in the record

The Fourth Amendment requires that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause" and that warrants particularly describe "the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Mapp v. Ohio (1961) applied the exclusionary rule to the states. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), decided 6 to 3, the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained "in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant" need not be excluded; Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens dissented. The record has also covered the Tenth Circuit's November 17 decision in United States v. Schear and the Sixth Circuit's November 6 decision in United States v. Cook, both on Fourth Amendment challenges in criminal cases.

Sources

Record updates report what happened and take no side. Signed analysis is kept apart, in Positions. Published November 18, 2026.

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