What happened
On November 20, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, decided State of Texas v. Blanche, No. 24-10386. By a 9-8 vote, it held that the House of Representatives' passage of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 did not comply with the Quorum Clause of Article I, Section 5, because the House reached a quorum by counting Members who recorded their presence by proxy. The court affirmed the district court's injunction barring enforcement of the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), part of that Act, against Texas.
Judge Cory T. Wilson wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Judge Elrod and Judges Jones, Smith, Willett, Ho, Duncan, Engelhardt and Oldham. Judge James E. Graves, Jr. dissented, joined by Judges Stewart, Richman, Southwick, Higginson, Douglas and Ramirez. Judge Haynes dissented separately.
What the opinion says
The opinion recounts that the House adopted House Resolution 965 in 2020, which provided that a Member "whose presence is recorded by a designated proxy under this resolution shall be counted for the purpose of establishing a quorum." On the Act's final passage in December 2022, the vote was 225 to 201, and according to the Congressional Record, 226 Members recorded their presence and vote by proxy.
The majority first held that the enrolled-bill rule of Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark (1892) does not bar review, because "Texas does not contest the facts regarding the House's passage of the Act" and its claim "implicates only the legal meaning of the Quorum Clause."
On the merits, the court read the Clause's power to "compel the Attendance of absent Members" as referring to physical presence. It reasoned that "The Rulemaking Clause is not so expansive that it can be read, as the Government urges, to subsume the Quorum Clause." Its key sentence: "The Clause's text, context, original understanding, and unbroken historical application all indicate that Members of Congress must be present for quorum purposes ... 'Proxy presence' does not count." On unanimous consent, the majority wrote that the quorum requirement "may coexist with Congress's use of unanimous consent to presume an ongoing quorum."
The majority described its judgment as narrow: "our decision extends no further than affirming the relief awarded by the district court," which enjoined enforcement of the PWFA only against Texas.
The other side
Judge Graves agreed that the enrolled-bill rule does not bar review, but wrote that he "cannot agree with their addition of a new requirement to the Quorum Clause," and that "the plain text of the Quorum Clause contains no physical presence requirement." Relying on United States v. Ballin (1892), he wrote that courts reviewing a House rule may ask only whether it ignores constitutional restraints, violates fundamental rights, or lacks "a reasonable relation" between means and ends. He wrote that the Clause's reference to compelling attendance "begs the question" by assuming that the presence compelled must be physical.
On history, the dissent pointed to the use of unanimous consent since 1789, which in its account has proceeded without a majority physically present, and wrote that this "evinces a strong history and tradition of understanding the Quorum Clause to not require physical presence." The dissent also questioned why, if the whole Act was unconstitutionally passed, relief should reach only "one small sliver" of it, and how Texas could challenge the PWFA "despite accepting millions of dollars under the very same" Act. It closed: "Simply put, the majority's decision is illogical, inexplicable, and invalid."
A footnote to the majority opinion records that "Judge Haynes states that she does not think it is appropriate to throw out the Federal House of Representatives in this arena, so she dissents."
Where it sits in the record
The district court ruled for Texas in Texas v. Garland, 719 F. Supp. 3d 521 (N.D. Tex. 2024). A divided Fifth Circuit panel then reversed, holding that the "Quorum Clause does not require physical presence for a house of Congress to conduct business" (Texas v. Bondi, 149 F.4th 529 (5th Cir. 2025)). The full court granted rehearing en banc and vacated that panel opinion. Both the majority and the dissent rely on United States v. Ballin (1892), the Supreme Court's principal earlier interpretation of the Quorum Clause, and on Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark (1892).
Sources
Record updates report what happened and take no side. Signed analysis is kept apart, in Positions. Published November 21, 2026.