Sixth Circuit, Doe #1 v. Lee: Tennessee's sex-offender classifications, the Ex Post Facto Clause and standing

The Sixth Circuit held that Tennessee's registry classifications, applied to people whose offenses predate the registry, do not impose punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause. It held that the plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their challenge to the law's geographical restrictions against the TBI Director, and vacated the injunction.

CourtNovember 13, 20264 min readThe Constilumen record

What happened

On November 13, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided Doe #1 v. Lee (No. 25-6122), the second appeal in a challenge by eight Tennessee registrants to the State's sex-offender-registration law. Each plaintiff's qualifying offense came before Tennessee's registry existed, and each argued that the law, as applied to him, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 10.

On remand from the first appeal (Doe v. Lee, 2024), the district court had held that the law's "violent sexual offender" and "offender against children" classifications, and several geographical restrictions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-211, were punitive as applied to the plaintiffs. It entered a permanent injunction against David Rausch, Director of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI).

The Sixth Circuit reversed on the classification claim, vacated the judgment on the geographical claims with instructions to dismiss them without prejudice, and vacated the injunction. Judge Siler wrote the opinion for a panel that included Judges Nalbandian and Davis. No separate opinion was filed.

What the opinion says

Proper defendant for the classifications. The court held that Director Rausch may be sued over the classifications. TBI maintains the registry, and since March 2025 state law directs it to classify registrants and notify them. "TBI's assignment, maintenance, notice, and publication of the classifications are the acts Plaintiffs challenge, and an order directed to TBI would redress the alleged injury from those acts."

Retrospective, but not punishment. The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the classifications operate retrospectively: applying them to earlier offenses "changes the legal consequences of completed conduct." It then applied the two-step test of Smith v. Doe (2003). At the first step, it found that the General Assembly "intended a civil regulatory scheme," noting the statute's statement that disclosure "shall not be construed as punitive." At the second step, guided by the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez factors, it held that Smith, Cutshall v. Sundquist (1999) and Doe v. Bredesen (2007) "foreclose Plaintiffs' claim that Tennessee's statutory classifications ... become punishment merely because they turn on convictions rather than individualized risk findings."

The plaintiffs relied on Does #1-5 v. Snyder (2016). They argued that Tennessee's labels communicate "present dangerousness" without an individualized assessment and carry stigma like Michigan's published tiers. The court said the Act's own findings "lend that argument some force," but held that Snyder assessed Michigan's "cumulative regime" as a whole and "does not establish that an offense-based classification, standing alone, supplies the 'clearest proof' of punishment." The court also considered the public profiles that once displayed "VIOLENT" and "VIOLENT AGAINST CHILDREN," which TBI's counsel said at argument are no longer used. It held that this added stigma "does not provide the 'clearest proof' of punishment." Its conclusion: "Because the classifications do not impose punishment, their retrospective application to Plaintiffs does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause."

No standing on the geographical claims. On the restrictions on where registrants may live, work and be present, the court held that the plaintiffs had not shown an injury "fairly traceable to Director Rausch or likely to be redressed by relief against him." The plaintiffs' declarations pointed to a local registry office, a state-court ruling, their own understanding of the rules and a parole officer; "[n]one attributes to TBI a decision applying the geographical restrictions or a threat of enforcement." The court said TBI's proposed notices to other officials "may be feasible. But feasibility is not redressability." It did not reach the merits of those restrictions, and it did not decide "whether another official would be a proper defendant."

The district court's view. The district court had treated Tennessee's classifications as "direct analogues to Snyder's tiers" because, in its view, they were at least as shaming. The Sixth Circuit said that comparison "overlooks" the offense-based schemes upheld in Smith and Bredesen and the limited effects of the public wording.

Where it sits in the record

The first appeal, Doe v. Lee, 102 F.4th 330 (6th Cir. 2024), held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue Governor Lee and directed a provision-by-provision review against Director Rausch. The Supreme Court's Smith v. Doe (2003) upheld Alaska's registry against an Ex Post Facto challenge. The Sixth Circuit's Does #1-5 v. Snyder (2016), as this opinion describes it, weighed Michigan's published tiers together with residence, work and in-person reporting requirements as one regime. The same day, the Sixth Circuit decided two appeals about Michigan's 2021 registry law, Doe v. Whitmer and Does v. Michigan State Police, covered in an earlier record update.

Sources

Record updates report what happened and take no side. Signed analysis is kept apart, in Positions. Published November 15, 2026.

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