Seventh Circuit, Rodgers v. Neal: an unmentioned juvenile sentencing option, a guilty plea and Sixth Amendment prejudice

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief to an Indiana prisoner who pleaded guilty at seventeen without being told of a juvenile alternative sentencing law. Reviewing de novo, the panel held he had not shown prejudice under Strickland because he offered no contemporaneous evidence that he would have gone to trial or obtained a better deal.

CourtNovember 20, 20264 min readThe Constilumen record

What happened

On November 20, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a federal habeas corpus petition brought by Christopher Rodgers, who pleaded guilty in Indiana state court to felony murder committed at age seventeen and agreed to a fixed forty-five-year sentence. Rodgers argued that his trial attorney denied him the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment by never telling him about Indiana Code § 31-30-4-2, a discretionary alternative sentencing scheme for juveniles tried in adult court. Judge St. Eve wrote the opinion for a unanimous panel that also included Chief Judge Brennan and Judge Taibleson.

What the opinion says

The scheme, the court noted, took effect on July 1, 2013, before Rodgers's plea and sentencing. The Indiana Court of Appeals had rejected his claim on the ground that the law was not yet in effect; the State conceded that this was wrong. Because "all agree" that the last reasoned state-court decision "relied on an unreasonable factual determination," the panel reviewed the Sixth Amendment claim de novo rather than under the deference the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ordinarily requires.

Applying Strickland v. Washington, the court went directly to prejudice without deciding whether counsel's performance was deficient. It addressed three points:

  • The district court's test. The district court had denied relief because the state trial court was unlikely to have ordered alternative sentencing. The panel held that this "asked and answered the wrong question": under Lee v. United States, the inquiry "focuses on a defendant's decisionmaking," and if Rodgers would have chosen trial, "the prejudice analysis ends there."
  • A better plea deal. Rodgers argued he could have negotiated an open plea that preserved his eligibility for alternative sentencing. The court said it "need not definitively embrace nor define the boundaries" of that theory of prejudice, which it has not adopted, because Rodgers offered no contemporaneous evidence that the State would have offered such terms. It observed that circuits applying the theory have done so "only in the immigration context, and only in narrow circumstances."
  • Going to trial. Relying on Lee's instruction that courts "should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions," the court held that Rodgers's attempt to withdraw his plea at sentencing did not show he would have chosen trial if properly advised, because that request rested on a claim of innocence, "not apprehension over his sentence." The panel also stated that its earlier decision in Pidgeon v. Smith (2015), which credited a defendant's after-the-fact testimony, predates Lee, and that "We can no longer rely solely on post hoc assertions, even if the incentives theoretically align."

The opinion concludes: "Rodgers may well have rejected the fixed forty-five-year sentence if properly informed of the alternative sentencing scheme. Perhaps he would have gone to trial, or perhaps the State would have offered something better. But the evidence he offers amounts only to post hoc assertions, unsupported assumptions, and bare speculation. Without more, he cannot show prejudice—no matter the theory."

The other side

There was no dissent or separate opinion. As the opinion summarizes them, Rodgers argued that his move to withdraw the plea showed that "the length of his sentence was of paramount importance" and that "he was always willing to risk a guarantee if the possibility of something better existed"; that both lawyers' description of the deal as in his best interest suggested he had been seeking "any viable path to a lesser sentence"; and that the State's position on appeal, that alternative sentencing was unlikely, implied the State would not have made it "a sticking point in negotiations." The court rejected each argument as resting on speculation rather than contemporaneous evidence.

Where it sits in the record

The two-part test for ineffective assistance comes from Strickland v. Washington (1984), which builds on the right to counsel recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963). The plea-bargaining standards the panel applied come from Hill v. Lockhart (1985), Missouri v. Frye (2012), Lafler v. Cooper (2012) and Lee v. United States (2017). Within the Seventh Circuit, the opinion applies Anderson v. United States (2024) and Nissenbaum v. Jennings (2025). The case number is 24-1231.

Sources

Record updates report what happened and take no side. Signed analysis is kept apart, in Positions. Published November 21, 2026.

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