Seventh Circuit, United States v. Daoud: waiving counsel at sentencing and the Faretta colloquy

On November 19, 2026, a unanimous Seventh Circuit panel held that Adel Daoud knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel before his resentencing, and affirmed the denial of his motion to withdraw his Alford plea and his 27-year sentence. Judge St. Eve wrote the opinion.

CourtNovember 19, 20264 min readThe Constilumen record

What happened

On November 19, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided United States v. Daoud, Nos. 24-2367, 24-2369 and 24-2370, in a published opinion. Adel Daoud entered an Alford plea, pleading guilty while maintaining his innocence, to ten counts arising from three cases: an attempt to detonate what he believed was a bomb, which was a device supplied in an FBI sting operation; soliciting the murder of the FBI agent who had posed as his partner in that plan; and an attack on another inmate while in custody. In 2016 the district court found him incompetent to stand trial; in 2018 it found him competent again. He was first sentenced to 16 years, a sentence the Seventh Circuit held substantively unreasonable in 2020.

On remand, Daoud moved to withdraw his plea, which the district court denied. In December 2022 he invoked his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself at resentencing. Judge Matthew F. Kennelly of the Northern District of Illinois granted the request after a colloquy and kept his appointed lawyer as standby counsel. In July 2024 the court sentenced Daoud to 27 years' imprisonment and lifetime supervised release.

The panel (Chief Judge Brennan and Judges Ripple and St. Eve) affirmed on every issue. Judge St. Eve wrote the opinion. There were no separate writings.

What the opinion says

Waiver of counsel. The court stated the governing rule: "The Sixth Amendment right to representation in a criminal case generally includes a defendant's right to represent himself, so long as he makes a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary choice to forego counsel," citing Faretta v. California (1975). It held that because "the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation applies at sentencing, a Faretta inquiry is appropriate," and that district courts have discretion to shape that inquiry to the stage of the case.

Daoud argued that the colloquy was too thin: that the court should have probed his reasons for proceeding without a lawyer, addressed his mental health history, and asked whether he was taking his medication. The court declined to "impose a specific script," writing that "[w]e have never prescribed magic words for what the Faretta colloquy requires at any stage of the proceeding." On medication, it said that confirming compliance "may be prudent" when a court knows a defendant is medicated, but "that is a context-specific question best left to the district judge," and it saw "no reason to impose such a general requirement."

Weighing the remaining factors, the court pointed to Daoud's statement that he would "rather do it myself," his roughly ten years of representation by counsel, his consultation with standby counsel, and his experience of a prior sentencing on the same convictions. It concluded: "Daoud knew the risks of proceeding to sentencing pro se, so his knowing and informed decision to waive counsel stands."

Plea withdrawal. The court held that a claim of legal innocence does not by itself justify withdrawing an Alford plea, since such a plea already allows the defendant to maintain innocence, and that the record showed Daoud knew of his entrapment and mental-health defenses when he pleaded. It held he had waived any argument based on reassignment to a new judge, adding that "defendants can claim no right to be sentenced by a particular judge."

Sentence. The court held the below-Guidelines sentence of 324 months substantively reasonable. It found that Daoud had at least forfeited any mental-health mitigation argument, having chosen, after consulting standby counsel, not to submit the mental-health evaluation the district court had urged him to obtain.

The other side

The panel was unanimous. As the opinion recounts them, Daoud argued through appellate counsel that his waiver was not knowing and intelligent because the colloquy did not adequately address his history of incompetency and his medication; that changed circumstances, including his improved mental health, new counsel and the remand to a different judge, made his plea involuntary; and that his sentence failed to account for his mental health and his youth at the time of the first offense. The court addressed and rejected each argument.

Where it sits in the record

The opinion rests on Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which recognized the right of self-representation, and on Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004), which held that a full Faretta colloquy is not required when a defendant pleads guilty without counsel. This record's entry on Gideon v. Wainwright concerns the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Earlier in this case, the Seventh Circuit reversed Daoud's first sentence as substantively unreasonable in United States v. Daoud, 980 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 2020).

Sources

Record updates report what happened and take no side. Signed analysis is kept apart, in Positions. Published November 20, 2026.

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