Fourth Circuit, KalshiEX v. Martin: sports event contracts, Maryland's gaming laws and federal preemption

On November 18, 2026, a divided Fourth Circuit panel affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction that Kalshi sought against Maryland's gaming regulators. The two judges in the majority wrote separate concurrences giving different reasons, and one judge dissented.

CourtNovember 18, 20264 min readThe Constilumen record

What happened

On November 18, 2026, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District of Maryland's denial of a preliminary injunction sought by KalshiEX LLC against Maryland's gaming regulators. Kalshi operates an exchange designated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). It argued that the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) preempts Maryland's sports-wagering laws as applied to sports event contracts traded on its exchange. The case came to the court after Maryland's gaming authorities sent Kalshi a cease-and-desist letter on April 7, 2025.

The judgment is a one-line per curiam: "The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED." Judges Gregory and Thacker joined it, and each wrote a separate concurrence explaining a different route to affirmance. Judge Benjamin dissented.

What the opinions say

Judge Gregory (concurring). Judge Gregory wrote that the appeal "presents a narrow question of federal preemption." He grounded the analysis in the Supremacy Clause, which provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land" (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2), and in the presumption that the states' historic police powers are not displaced unless that was "the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." He did not decide whether Kalshi's contracts are "swaps" under the CEA. He wrote that "even assuming they are, neither the Act nor the CFTC's implementation of it clearly establish that such contracts are entitled to trade on a DCM free from state gaming laws."

On field preemption, he concluded: "Accordingly, the CEA does not field preempt Maryland's gaming laws." On conflict preemption, he found that Maryland's licensing requirement neither makes compliance with federal law impossible nor stands as an obstacle to Congress's objectives. In his words, "Kalshi cannot manufacture a conflict by choosing not to comply with one sovereign's otherwise valid regulatory requirements." His conclusion: "Until Congress and the CFTC are clear, I conclude that Maryland has concurrent authority under these facts."

Judge Thacker (concurring in the judgment). Judge Thacker wrote that she reached affirmance "via a different route." In her view, "This case presents a routine issue of statutory interpretation." She read the CEA's definition of a swap, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(ii), and concluded: "In my view, Appellant's sporting event based contracts are not swaps within the meaning of the CEA." On that reading the contracts lie outside the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction, and "Maryland officials can co-regulate these contracts." She also wrote that Kalshi's reading of the statute would reach "an absurd result that would criminalize any sports bet placed in the United States."

The other side

Judge Benjamin dissented. She framed the appeal as turning on "(1) whether Kalshi's sporting event contracts are 'swaps' under the CEA and, if so, (2) whether the CEA preempts otherwise applicable state law." She answered both in Kalshi's favor: "Because I think Kalshi's sports-related event contracts are 'swaps' under the CEA, and because Congress has granted 'exclusive jurisdiction' over such swaps to the CFTC, I would vacate the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction and remand for further proceedings."

She disagreed with the first concurrence's decision to leave the swap question open, writing that "a finding that preemption applies depends upon Kalshi's sports-related contracts qualifying as 'swaps.'" On the merits she wrote: "if Kalshi were offering its contracts without CFTC designation, then Maryland could regulate it. But because Kalshi is a CFTC-designated DCM, it's subject to the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction and state law is field preempted." Having found field preemption, she did not reach conflict preemption. She would have remanded for the district court to weigh the remaining preliminary-injunction factors.

Where it sits in the record

Judge Gregory's concurrence lists other appellate rulings on the same question, which have reached different results. The Third Circuit, in KalshiEX LLC v. Flaherty, 172 F.4th 220 (3d Cir. 2026), found preemption on the ground that the contracts are swaps traded on a designated contract market. The Sixth Circuit, in Kalshiex LLC v. Schuler (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 2026), and the Ninth Circuit, in KalshiEx LLC v. Assad, 190 F.4th 1098 (9th Cir. 2026), did not find preemption. The concurrence describes both as resting on the view that the contracts are not, or likely are not, swaps. Judge Gregory also lists district-court rulings on both sides.

In Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), the Supreme Court held New York's steamboat-monopoly acts invalid insofar as they barred vessels licensed under federal law for the coasting trade from navigating New York waters. The appeal reviewed only the denial of a preliminary injunction.

Sources

Record updates report what happened and take no side. Signed analysis is kept apart, in Positions. Published November 18, 2026.

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